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Objective Probability* 
Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. 
A distinction is sometimes made between "statistical" and 
"subjective" probabilities. This is based on a distinction between 
"unique " events and "repeatable " events. We argue that this 
distinction is untenable, since all events are "unique " and all events 
belong to "kinds", and offer a conception of probability for AI in which 
(1) all probabilities are based on -- possibly vague -- statistical 
knowledge, and (2) every statement in the language has a probability. 
This conception of probability can be applied to very rich languages. 
1 . Objectivity 
When is a probability 'objective'? To say that a 
certain kind of event has a certain probability in a reference 
class is to make a claim that is objective, in the sense that 
it is completely independent of what anyone knows o:r 
believes, completely independent of what the evidence 
supports. The kind of event has that probability or relative 
frequency in that class, or it doesn't. That is a matter 
ofjectively determined by the world. 
However, the ve:ry fact that :relative frequencies or 
limiting frequencies have the values they have, :regardless of 
what anyone knows or believes, suggests that this may not 
be the most useful concept of probability fo:r making decisions 
or representing the impact of evidence. Fu:rthermo:re, as has 
been pointed out by those who endorse this conception of 
probability, this notion does not apply to the single case: One 
can speak of the probability of heads in the class of coin 
tosses, but not the probability of heads on the next toss. 
One response to this has been to move to the 
opposite extreme: the notion of subjective probability. 
According to this idea, probability represents the degree of 
belief of an individual. Of course fo:r an individual's degrees 
of belief to be :representable by a probability, they must 
conform to the axioms of the probability calculus. The 
condition that they so conform, a condition we would 
naturally impose on any machine :representation of beliefs, is 
construed as a condition of rationality. But given that this 
condition of :rationality is satisfied, given that the degrees in 
:related events are related as the axioms of the probability 
calculus stipulate, there are no further constraints to be 
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satisfied. Any distribution of belief is as good as any other. 
But there are other sorts of objectivity one can 
consider. Carnap's (1951) interpretation of probability was 
perfectly objective, but intended to serve the functions of the 
subjective interpretation. The idea was that each sentence 
of a formal language was to receive a measure, and that the 
probability of a sentence h, relative to a body of evidence e, 
c(h, e) , was to be defined in terms of that measure. The 
probability of a sentence h was the value of the probability 
of the sentence h relative to the total body of evidence of the 
agent. 
This is not subjective probability, though probabilities 
are in a sense relativized to agents. The reason that it is 
not subjective is that it is the evidence and not the 
individual, that determines the values of the probabilities. 
Any individual having that evidence ought, if he is rational, 
to have exactly that probability. Probability is not 
determined by the whim of the individual, but by the 
evidence the individual has at his disposal. 
The treatment of probability offered here is objective 
in this sense. The value of a probability depends on the 
evidence the individual has at his disposal but not on the 
accidental interests of the agent. Probability is objective in 
the sense that logic is: given a set of premises, what is 
derivable is determined by the laws of logic, not by the 
interests of an individual who may accept those premises. 
What implies what is an objective matter. What makes 
what probable is equally an objective matter. 
Finally, the treatment offered here is intended to be 
monolithic; we intend that this computable concept of 
probability is the only measure of uncertainty needed in 
updating knowledge and making decisions. 
2. Repeatability 
Almost everyone will agree that when our 
background statistical knowledge is extensive enough, -'1llii 
when the case with which we are concerned is a "repeatable 
event", then objective probabilities are appropriate, and these 
are the probabilities that should enter into the computation 
of expectation and into our decision theory. Unique events 
are alleged to call for subjective probability. But I claim 
that from a down-to-earth practical point of view, from the 
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point of view that seeks to compute probabilities and 
expectations for making decisions, the distinction between 
'repeatable' and 'unique' events 1s not only untenable, but 
seriously misleading. 
The classical repeatable event 1s the toss of a c01n. 
Not only can we toss a coin over and over again; coins have 
been tossed over and over again, and in the experience of 
each of us there is a large database of results of coin tosses 
(or an impressionistic resume of such a database) . And so we 
can regard the next toss as a member of a class of tosses, of 
which we have reason to believe that half land heads. 
But not the last toss. The fourteenth toss? It 
depends on what we know about it. Has it been performed? 
Do we actually know its result? A particular toss, at a 
particular time and place, cannot be repeated. We all know 
that. But the event can be repeated in 'all relevant 
respects'. We don't have to make the toss at the same time 
or the same place; we don't have to use the same coin; we 
don't have to use the same kind of coin; we don't have to 
flip it in any particular way. 
These are matters that we judge to be the case. 
Does that mean that 'repeatability' is a subjective matter? 
Not at all. We learn what the relevant factors are; it 1s a 
matter of objective knowledge. 
In principle, many people would say, we could 
perfectly well know enough to predict the outcome of a single 
specified toss. If we knew the momenta imparted to the 
coin, its distance from the surface on which it is to land, 
the relevant coefficients of elasticity, etc. , we could 
presumably predict the outcome of the toss. Every toss is 
unique with respect to these properties. But that does not 
prevent us from regarding ordinary coin tosses (correctly) as 
repeatable events. 
3. Unigueness 
Louis Narens [1985, 282] argues that "the 
uncertainties that people encounter in the everyday world, 
that businessmen encounter in their economic activities, that 
the military encounters in war, etc. , are not of this 
[repeatable] type: repeatability of "experiments" are [sic] not 
feasible and often impossible. " 
Suppose I am interested in whether or not my friend 
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Sam will be at home tonight after supper. Whether or not 
he will be home depends on factors I can specify. If there is 
a good Western in town he may be more likely to be at the 
movies. If there were to be a chemistry examination 
tomorrow, Sam would most likely be at home. In short, 
this seems like a perfect case for subjective probability. But 
if I have known Sam for a long time, I do have a basis for 
knowing how often, in general, he goes to the movies on 
week-nights. My knowledge is neither so precise nor so 
secure as my knowledge about the coin, but it is surely not 
non-existent. 
We must beware of allowing the variety of our 
knowledge about Sam to serve as an excuse for guessing 
wildly. Analogously, if we were to have detailed and 
microscopic data concerning the coin toss, we could predict 
with a better than 5096 success rate. This possibility should 
not be allowed to undermine our sensible tendency to assign 
a probability of a half to the occurrence of heads on the 
specified toss when we lack that microscopic data. 
4. A simple system 
Here is a very simple example of how objective 
(frequency or chance) probability can be applied to "unique 
events". It is essentially due to Reichenbach [1949] . It is a 
step backward from the discussion of the previous section, 
but we will regain our insights in the following section. 
Let R = {r 1 , . . . r n } be a finite set of potential 
reference classes, let P - {P 1, . . . , Pk } be a finite set of 
properties (including such properties as that of being a 
member of a particular reference class) , and let I - {i 1 
. . . , im } be a set of distinct individuals or individual 
events. 
We can define a language on this basis in the usual 
way. The reference classes may be of high dimension; 
predicates may represent complicated relations; individuals 
may be ordered t -tuples of elementary individuals. 
Add to this language enough mathematics to do 
statistics, and define an item of possible statistical knowledge 
to be a sentence of the syntactical form: "96(rj,Ps) = x "  
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which we read: the proportion of objects in the reference 
class rj that have the property P5 1s x .  This is llQ1 
in tended to be a transcription of past frequencies; it is 
intended to reflect an inference that will often, but not 
always, be based on the observation of past frequencies. 
In general, for the simple case, the following axioms 
suffice to yield appropriate objective probabilities reflecting 
what is known -- the evidence -- in K. 
A1 If S and T are known to have the same 
truth-value, then they have the same 
probability. 
This ax10m does not require that S and T be equivalent 1n 
any strong sense; all that is required is that we know that 
they have the same truth value. 
A2. 1 R is closed under intersection. 
A2.2 
A2.3 
lfi;t!J 
If r· 1 
q , rJ E R , then � "ri = rJ "E K 
r J then 
"ri r J E K . 
Similarly for properties: 
A3 . 1 P is closed under conjunction and negation. 
A3. 2 If 1 ;t! J, Pi , P J E P, then ,.., "(x) (Pi (x ) 
A3.3 
A bit of logical 
A4 
To insure that 
<--> Pj (x ) ) " E K. 
If (x) (Pi(x) --> P J(x) ) ,  then 
"(x) (Pi(x) --> PJ(x))" E K. 
closure: 
If "ix E ry " E K and "ix E rw
" E K ,  then 
"ix E r y r w " E K . 
"having the same truth value" generates 
equivalence classes, we stipulate for any S, 
A5.1 If "S1 <--> s2 II E K '  then "S2 <--> s1 II 
A5.2 
A5.3 
And finally, 
E K .  
If "S1 <--> s2 II and "S2 <--> s3 II are in 
K '  then "S1 <--> s3 II is in K . 
"S1 <--> s1 " E K . 
A6 For every non-mathematical sentence S in 
our language, there exists a Py and exactly one ix such 
that "S <--> PyCix)" E K. 
A 7 There exists a model of the sentences in K , with 
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II% (X, Y) II construed as the proportion of X 's that are Y 's. 
We can now define the probability of a sentence S 
relative to a body of knowledge K to be x just in case S 1s 
known in K to be equivalent to a sentence of the form 
II P2(iy) 
II -- this is just to say that the biconditional II S <--> 
P2(iy) 
II is in K -- and for some reference class r w to which 
iy is known to belong, ll%(rw , P2) = x I
I is in K, and, 
finally, if rw' is another reference class to which iy is 
known to belong, and II% (r w' , P2) � x II is in K, then it 1s 
known that r w is included in r w' . (This is just to say that 
llrw C rw' II € K . ) Formally, 
01 Prob (S, K) = x if and only if there are P z , 
ly , and r w such that 
(1) liS <--> P2(iy) II € K. 
(2) 11iy € rwll € K. 
(3) ll%(rw , P2) = x II € K. 
(4) If lliy E rw' I
I € K, and ll%(rw' , P2) � 
x II is in K, then II r w C r w' II 
€ K. 
Thus r w is the smallest reference class about which we have 
statistical information to which iy is known to belong. This 
is essentially Reichenbach's idea except for the addition of 
axiom A1. 
We can generate the probability more clearly by 
putting the fourth condition as a constraint on a table. Let 
the first column of the table contain a list of all the 
reference classes r w to which iy is known to belong. Let 
the second column contain the value of x(r w) from the 
corresponding item of possible statistical knowledge: 
ll%(rw, Pz) = x(rw)11• Work down the table, deleting every 
row that fails condition (4) . (Rule: if x(rw) � x(rw' ) , 
delete both rows unless II r w C r w' II is in K . ) There may 
be several rows left, but they will all mention the same 
value of x. There may be no rows left. 
5 .  Limitations. 
This approach deals perfectly reasonably with tosses 
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of coins and the like. But it fails to provide for the case in 
which we get a probability from approximate knowledge of 
frequencies. It gives us no probability at all when we know 
of iy that it belongs to t
wo reference classes, our knowledge 
about those reference classes doesn't agree, and we don't 
know that either reference class is included in the other. 
The remedy is simple and obvious, but it entails 
considerable complication. We allow items of possible 
statistical knowledge to embody approximate knowledge. To 
stick to one syntactical form, let us write 
"%(rw ,P2) E [x1 ,x2 ]" 
to mean that the proportion of objects (or the chance of an 
object) in the reference class r w having the property P2 is 
in the closed interval [x1, x2 ] . 
Suddenly we have statistical knowledge about every 
property and every reference class: at the very least we will 
know that the proportion lies in [0, 1]. And now what do 
we mean by " � "? These changes work: Say that two 
intervals "differ" if neither is included in the other, replace 
"x " by "[x1 , x2 ] "  throughout D1, and rewrite clause (4) of 
D1 to say that if r w and r w I differ, then r w is known to 
be included in r wl : 
(4') If "iy E r w I " is in K and 
"%(rwl ,P2) E [x1 ,x2J" is in K 
and [x1 I , x21 ] differs from [x1 , x2 ] ,  
then "r w C r w I " is in K . 
This definition of probability is still limited -- it 
turns out that we would like two other relations, in addition 
to the subset relation, to excuse "difference". And we would 
like to be able to consider equivalence among statements 
concerning different individuals. (A general definition along 
these lines is provided in [1983]. ) But it is already quite 
powerful, and has some interesting properties: 
(1) All probabilities are objective, in the sense that 
every probability is based on empirical knowledge about 
frequencies or chances in the world. 
(2) Every statement in the language has a 
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probability: there is no distinction between statements 
concerning "repeatable" events and statements concerning 
"unique" events. 
(3) No a priori probabilities are required; all 
probabilities can be based on experience. (But how they can 
be so based is another story. ) 
(4) Any application of Bayes' theorem that is 
justified by background knowledge of frequencies will be 
preserved. 
6 . Conclusion. 
Probabilistic knowledge may be regarded as all of a 
piece. There is no need to distinguish between "statistical" 
probabilities that have objective warrant in the world, and 
"subjective" probabilities that merely reflect our subjective 
feelings. When we apply our knowledge of statistical facts to 
individual cases it is the probability of a unique event that is 
at issue but it is based on some (possibly approximate) 
statistical knowledge. 
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